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Tools and terms for understanding illegal 
wildlife trade
Jacob Phelps1,2*, Duan Biggs3,4,5, and Edward L Webb5,6
Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is a global conservation issue that threatens thousands of species, including fish, 
fungi, medicinal plants, and charismatic mammals. Despite widespread recognition of the problem, debates 
on the science and policy of IWT generally concentrate on a few high- profile species (eg rhinoceros, tigers, 
elephants) and often overlook or conflate complex IWT products, actors, networks, and contexts. A poor 
understanding of IWT is aggravated by the lack of systematic vocabulary and conceptual tools with which to 
analyze complex phenomena in a more structured way. We synthesize the available evidence on IWT across 
taxa and contexts into a typology- based framework that considers (1) the diversity of wildlife products; 
(2) the roles of various actors involved with IWT, including harvesters, intermediaries, and consumers; and 
(3) common IWT network configurations. We propose ways in which these tools can inform structured 
 analyses of IWT, to help ensure more nuanced, appropriate, targeted, and effective responses to illegal 
 wildlife harvest, trade, and use.
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Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) targets thousands of  species  of terrestrial and marine animals, plants, and fungi 
worldwide (IUCN 2016), with cascading impacts on the 
environment, livelihoods, food security, national secu-
rity, and sustainable development (Dickson 2008; 
Brashares et al. 2014; NOAA 2016). While trade in 
many taxa is legal and regulated, escalating illegal trade 
is of increasing conservation concern globally. IWT has 
attracted renewed societal, media, and political atten-
tion, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars in addi-
tional investment, largely in response to marked 
increases in elephant and rhinoceros poaching (Duffy 
and Humphreys 2014; Sutherland et al. 2014; UW 
2014).
There are growing scientific and policy debates over 
which types of conservation interventions are most 
effective, including increased enforcement, demand 
reduction strategies, and provision of alternative live-
lihoods, as well as market- based and incentive- oriented 
approaches (Biggs et al. 2013; Sutherland et al. 2014; 
Duffy 2014; Bennett 2015). The diversity of proposed 
interventions reflects the complexity of IWT, yet 
many policy debates approach IWT as a simple and 
homogeneous phenomenon (Österblom et al. 2011; 
Brashares et al. 2014). For example, taxonomic biases 
mean that a few charismatic species (eg rhinoceros, 
tigers, elephants) are treated as representative of 
broader IWT (UW 2014), while the vast majority of 
traded species are overlooked (Nijman et al. 2012a). 
Similarly, IWT discussions frequently classify the roles 
and motivations of diverse actors into simplistic cate-
gories of “poachers”, “perpetrators”, and “criminals” 
(Duffy 2014; UW 2014; US 2014). Diversity is further 
obscured by a growing focus on organized criminal 
 syndicates in the trade of some taxa, which overlooks 
more mundane forms of wildlife trade and use (Bennett 
2011; Pires 2012; Douglas and Alie 2014; US 2014; 
Duffy 2016).
Indeed, illegal systems can be difficult to study directly; 
as a result, not surprisingly, many policies underappreci-
ate associated patterns and nuances (von Lampe 2012). 
However, lessons from the illicit drug trade highlight the 
limitations of interventions based on popular misunder-
standings about illegal trade dynamics. Broad assump-
tions about how trade is organized and responds to 
 interventions have led to policies that overlook the 
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In a nutshell:
• Policy debates often treat illegal wildlife trade (IWT) as 
a homogeneous phenomenon that affects a small number 
of high-profile, charismatic species
• There is a need to recognize the diversity of products, 
actors, network structures, and contexts that define IWT 
activities
• We present a a set of tools and terms that can be used 
to evaluate this diversity more systematically
• The tools we present can help inform the design of 
 conservation actions and research to ensure more  appropriate 
and effective policy responses
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underlying causes of trade, and tend to ignore the resil-
ience of trade networks to enforcement (Williams 1998; 
Kenny 2007; LSE 2014). These policies can also fail to 
anticipate unintended consequences such as social 
impacts and undesirable price signals (eg when enforce-
ment restricts supply only to result in price increases that 
stimulate further trade).
Greater precision in IWT studies and debate is further 
impaired by the lack of a standardized vocabulary and an 
absence of frameworks to dissect IWT phenomena 
(South and Wyatt 2011). There is a clear need for tools 
to help navigate the diversity of products, actors, net-
works, and contexts that comprise IWT in a way that is 
structured and comprehensible (Ostrom 2009; Laird 
et al. 2010; von Lampe 2012). A shared lexicon would 
allow for more nuanced and productive dialogue, and 
improve formulation of research and conservation inter-
ventions.
Here, we review IWT across taxa and contexts, drawing 
from the IWT literature and field experience in order to 
(1) define IWT products, (2) present a typology (catego-
rization based on shared attributes) to define the key roles 
of IWT actors, (3) present a typology to understand com-
mon IWT network configurations, and (4) illustrate how 
these tools can facilitate a structured analysis of IWT 
interventions.
 J Defining IWT products
IWT involves the harvest, trade, and use of wild, bi-
ological specimens for purposes ranging from food to 
ornaments to construction (Table 1). It affects a wide 
range of flora, fauna, and fungi, and both live speci-
mens and various wildlife products needed or valued 
by humans. Notwithstanding that some forms of wildlife 
trade are legal, IWT is characterized by actions that 
contravene stated environmental regulations, including 
government legislation, rules governing private/commu-
nity resource- holder rights, and/or international agree-
ments (eg the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES]). 
Equally, many instances of harvest and trade are 
 unsustainable from an ecological perspective, but are 
not necessarily illegal.
Despite a tendency to associate IWT with a narrow 
range of taxa, trade affects thousands of species, including 
timber, marine organisms (eg illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing), small mammals, insects, plants, and 
reptiles (Laird et al. 2010; Nijman et al. 2012a; IUCN 
2016). Importantly, single species can provide multiple 
products that may enter completely different value chains 
(eg medicinal versus ornamental orchids). In addition, 
different forms or sources of a single product may be legal, 
while others are illegal (eg farmed versus wild- collected 
specimens; organisms collected within or outside of offi-
cial quotas; individuals traded domestically versus inter-
nationally).
 J Characterizing IWT actors
IWT involves a range of actors in harvest, trade, and 
use dimensions. Actors differ not only in roles they 
play along market chains, but also in their socioeco-
nomic attributes, preferences, and motivations; scales 
of operation and intensities of harvest; levels of tech-
nological investment; and sources of funding, levels of 
economic reliance, and knowledge, including that of 
associated regulations (Muth and Bowe 1998; Wyatt 
2009; South and Wyatt 2011; Duffy et al. 2015).
Our typology distinguishes roles played by harvesters, 
intermediaries, and consumers that, while not mutually 
exclusive, categorize key patterns across IWT situations 
(Table 1; Figure 1). Actors can participate in multiple 
roles, with a wide range of motivations that are both con-
text- and value- dependent, and that can change over 
time (South and Wyatt 2011; Duffy et al. 2015). Some 
actors are also highly specialized and focus on target- 
specific taxa, while others are more generic (eg wild meat, 
fish). Although illegal wildlife harvest and consumption 
are frequently characterized as the result of economic 
poverty or greed, motivations are usually far more com-
plex (Duffy et al. 2015); even among comparatively poor 
communities, wildlife consumption can be associated 
with preferences, stature, and higher incomes (Mbete 
et al. 2011). Similarly, harvesters may be poor in absolute 
terms, but well off in comparison to their neighbors, 
where IWT offers better economic prospects than alter-
native opportunities (Vira et al. 2014).
Wildlife harvesters
We distinguish among eight broad categories of har-
vester roles (Table 1; Figure 1). Subsistence harvesters 
are primarily engaged in the collection of wild resources 
for household or non- commercial local uses (Golden 
et al. 2013), but can overlap with more specialized 
commercial harvest. For example, in central Vietnam’s 
Thua Thien Hue Province, forest- accessing communities 
regularly use snares in subsistence harvest, although 
some residents also rely on targeted, specialized cages 
to trap stump- tailed macaques (Macaca arctoides) to 
supply luxury urban markets. Similar combinations of 
subsistence and commercial harvest exist among the 
Waorani communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon (see 
Example 3, below).
Both subsistence and commercial markets can also 
involve opportunistic harvest. In central Vietnam, resi-
dents sometimes fell Scaphium lychnophorum trees to more 
easily harvest its seeds for international markets (ELW, 
pers obs). While commercially motivated, behaviors such 
as this represent neither a regular nor primary livelihood, 
and are usually overlooked in IWT discussions (Muth 
and Bowe 1998; Eliason 1999; Pires 2012).
Specialized commercial harvesting often requires 
sophisticated technologies, networks, funding, and coor-
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dination. At the extreme, harvesting of high- value taxa 
and products (eg tigers, rhinos, birds of prey, shark fins, 
hardwood timber) often involves non- local professional 
 harvesters, criminal syndicates, and connections to the 
political elite. These individuals or groups may hire local 
residents (local guide) to harvest wildlife or guide 
 non- local harvesters (GW 2007; Wyatt 2009; Bennett 
2011). Recent African ivory seizures highlight the ability 
of these commercial harvesters to adapt to increasing 
enforcement (Milliken 2014; Vira et al. 2014).
Illegal harvest can also occur when harvesters break the 
rules associated with legal harvest systems (rule abuser). 
Table 1. Typology of key actor roles along IWT market chains
Harvesters
Subsistence Non- commercial harvest for household or local use (eg food, cultural, see list 
below), usually comparatively small scale
Specialist commercial Harvest with an explicit commercial orientation that often involves specialist 
skills or technologies. Includes different harvest intensities and levels of techno-
logical investment, and is led by both self- employed and hired harvesters, as well 
as by local residents and non-residents.
Opportunist Harvest based on chance encounters and circumstances, but not as a primary 
objective or livelihood strategy
Local guide Local residents hired to guide non-resident harvesters 
Rule abuser Knowing abuse of harvest rules, such as quotas (eg under or mis- reporting), 
boundaries (eg protected area), or restrictions on technology (eg certain traps, 
nets)
Bycatch Unintentional harvest of non- target species
Recreational Harvest for enjoyment
Reactionary Harvest associated with discontent or protest (eg in reaction to conservation 
policies or conflict with wildlife)
Intermediaries
Logistician Involved in ordering, aggregation, and transport, as well as financing and planning 
trade. May be directly involved in handling trade or involved at a distance.
Specialized smuggler Transport that requires specialized actions to evade detection or negotiate 
access, usually across borders (eg transboundary smuggling, specialist networks)
Government colluder Involved in using an official government position (eg park ranger, police officer, 
judge, prosecutor) to facilitate trade, whether for financial (corruption), social, 
or personal gain
Third party External services hired to support trade, but potentially unknowingly (eg bus or 
air transport) 
Processor Involved in product transformation (eg skinning, medicine preparation)
Launderer Involved in laundering illegal wildlife into legal markets chains (eg via captive 
breeding or processing operations)
Vendor Involved in direct sale to consumers or to other intermediaries (eg market, 
online platform)
Consumers
Medicinal Use associated with medicinal practices, usually traditional but some novel
Ornamental Use associated with ornaments and pets (eg ivory, shell, live parrots, aquarium 
fish) 
Cultural Use associated with long- standing traditional practices (eg feathers, pelts, ritual 
harvest)
Gift Use as a gift, often to gain/demonstrate social standing or show respect
Investment Use as an investment, usually of high- value taxa
Recreational Use associated with the act of recreational harvest (eg game hunting, sport 
fishing)
Animal food Use as food for other animals (eg fodder, bait, small animals)
Construction materials Use for construction materials (eg timber, rattan)
Fuel Use for burning for heat or cooking
Food Use for direct consumption, ranging from luxury consumption to basic 
 nutritional need
Notes: Categories are not mutually exclusive.
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For example, the abuse of allocated harvest quotas in the 
fishing and timber sectors, the use of illegal technologies 
such as snares or dynamite fishing, and hunting or collec-
tion within protected area boundaries can convert other-
wise legal harvest into illegal goods (Hatcher and Gordon 
2005; Radjawali 2011). Similarly, accidental bycatch of 
protected species (eg in snares or nets) can represent ille-
gal takes.
Illegal harvest can also be associated with recreational 
activities, or can represent a defensive response to con-
flict with wildlife, such as crop raiding that affects rural 
livelihoods, or opposition to conservation policies (reac-
tionary harvester; Muth and Bowe 1998; Oldfield 2003).
Trade intermediaries
Supplying wildlife or associated products to consumers 
typically relies on actors generically described as 
“middlemen”, although intermediaries in illegal net-
works can serve diverse and complex roles (UNODC 
2002). Working as logisticians involved in moving 
goods in ways that require specific contacts, networks, 
and skills (Warchol 2004; Wyatt 2009), such inter-
mediaries may be directly involved in ordering and 
handling illegal goods, or may be more distantly 
associated through financial links 
or by coordinating logistics for 
others (Milliken and Shaw 2012; 
Milliken 2014). Because accessing 
markets for illegal products can 
be challenging and risky, inter-
mediaries are often critical in 
facilitating access across interna-
tional borders (specialized smug-
gler), for instance by bribing or 
working with government agents 
(government colluders; eg 
Figure 2; Pires 2012; Vira et al. 
2014). In some instances, inter-
mediaries may be third parties 
that are unaware of their roles, 
as in the case of airlines or bus 
companies (TRAPS 2015).
Intermediaries may also engage in 
physical transformation of wildlife, 
such as cleaning, butchering, skin-
ning, or preparing medicines (pro-
cessors; eg Vira et al. 2014), which 
may require specialized skills or 
infrastructure, such as sawmills for 
timber. In addition, intermediaries 
may provide laundering services 
that integrate illegal products into 
mainstream legal value chains 
(launderers), as has been docu-
mented among farms that claim to 
raise porcupines for meat (Brooks 
et al. 2010), reptiles and birds for pets (Lyons and Natusch 
2011; Shepherd et al. 2012), and at lumber mills process-
ing timber for furniture (GP 2014). Most visibly, interme-
diaries also include consumer- facing vendors and their 
associated platforms (eg public markets, online platforms).
Wildlife consumers
Consumer uses of wildlife are as diverse as the taxa 
illegally traded (Table 1). Public attention is largely 
on the medicinal use of charismatic taxa in Asia. 
However, thousands of other species are also used as 
medicines globally (Laird et al. 2010; Nijman et al. 
2012a), and many taxa have other, complex social 
meanings and diverse uses (Courchamp et al. 2006; 
Truong et al. 2015). Wildlife and their parts can have 
ornamental uses, including as pets (Wyatt 2009; Pires 
2012), can serve as cultural objects (De Angelis 2012), 
and/or represent high- value gifts or investments (eg 
Gao and Clark 2014; Truong et al. 2015). Wildlife 
may be involved in activities where harvest itself is 
a recreational or cultural act (Muth and Bowe 1998). 
Some wildlife are used as animal food to feed  captive 
domesticated animals (Naylor et al. 2000), for 
 construction materials, and as fuel (eg charcoal; 
Figure 1. Diverse types of IWT harvesters. (a) Subsistence harvester with porcini 
mushroom (Boletus edulis) collected without permits in Forli Province, Italy. 
(b) African elephant (Loxodonta africana), widely targeted for ivory across its range by 
specialist commercial harvesters, often with support of local guides. (c) Inspection of a 
fishing vessel in the Gulf of Guinea suspected of abusing fishing rules (engaging in illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing).
(a)
(c)
(b)
D
 G
al
li
P
 M
an
ni
x;
 li
ce
ns
e:
 C
C
 B
Y
-S
A
 2
.0
K
 A
ku
am
oa
h-
B
oa
te
ng
; p
ub
lic
 d
om
ai
n
483
© The Ecological Society of America www.frontiersinecology.org
J Phelps et al. Illegal wildlife trade
Wyatt 2013). Importantly, many 
taxa are used for food, both to 
meet basic nutritional requirements 
and as luxury products to satisfy 
a range of consumer preferences 
(eg Example 3, below).
Consumers may be present any-
where along the market chain, 
including at or near the point of 
harvest, in association with trans-
port, or at defined end- markets, 
 restaurants, or online portals. Illegal 
transactions may occur in open mar-
kets or in secret, including through 
clandestine transactions, through 
the anonymity of online sales, or 
through the laundering of wild 
products (eg Figure 4). Importantly, 
downstream consumers are not nec-
essarily aware of the origins of such 
products (eg Figures 2 and 4) or of 
related regulations (GP 2014).
 J Understanding IWT networks
Actors in IWT are arranged into 
diverse network configurations 
(UNODC 2002; Kenney 2007), of 
which we identify seven common 
structures (Table 2). Their archi-
tecture ranges from simple relation-
ships – such as the subsistence and 
local use relationship, or a structure 
that links harvesters directly to 
consumers (Table 2, a and b) – to 
configurations that involve multiple 
intermediaries (Table 2f). Much of 
this complexity arises from restric-
tions to access, whether to the 
resource itself, to transport routes, 
or to consumers, including to distant 
 urban or international markets will-
ing to pay higher prices.
A network configuration restricted 
by resource access is defined by trade 
structured around a specific geo-
graphic area and/or limited set of 
harvesters (Table 2c). For example, 
the Lao newt (Laotriton laoensis) is 
endemic to high- elevation streams 
in a small area within northern Laos. As a result, interna-
tional collectors have relied on local residents with species 
knowledge and access to harvest newts for the pet trade 
(Phimmachak et al. 2012).
Gatekeeper configurations arise when a limited num-
ber of intermediaries control market access, based on 
the provision of pivotal services, contacts, or capital 
that enable them to overcome transport, enforcement, 
or technical barriers (Table 2d). For instance, the ille-
gal timber trade in Pará, Brazil, relies on central mills 
that provide timber processing and avenues through 
which to launder illegal timber into legal supply chains 
(GP 2014). Similarly, the Indonesian reptile trade 
requires specialized knowledge, contacts, and access to 
Figure 2. Network of illegal trade in protected ornamental orchids harvested in 
Southeast Asia. (a) Overview of trade network of plants from Lao PDR (People’s 
Democratic Republic) and Myanmar for sale in Thailand and internationally, including 
the roles of harvesters, intermediaries, and consumers (Phelps 2015; Phelps and Webb 
2015). Colored lines illustrate selected examples of trade network structures 
(see Table 2). (b) Ornamental orchid (Eria ornata) commonly harvested in Myanmar. 
(c) Ornamental orchid (Dendrobium lamyaiae), a narrowly distributed (possibly 
endemic) species harvested in Lao PDR.
(a)
(b) (c)
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permits to enable international trade (Figure 4). The 
live reef fish trade uses expensive technologies to keep 
fish healthy and attractive until they reach overseas 
restaurants (Radjawali 2011). Such centralized struc-
tures are also likely where criminal syndicates exclude 
other participants through force (Bennett 2011; 
Milliken 2014).
Trade networks can also be restricted by market access 
that mediate consumer access (Table 2e), such as specific 
stores, neighborhoods, markets, or online portals to 
which trade is restricted, forcing or enabling certain 
patterns of trade interactions. Restrictions may require 
several linked intermediaries (Table 2f) to enable 
transport, evade enforcement, pay bribes, and/or leverage 
social networks to facilitate trade across protected area 
boundaries, police checkpoints, or international borders 
(Radjawali 2011; Vira et al. 2014; Phelps 2015).
Structures with redundant pathways are characterized 
by complex web- shaped configurations, which are the 
result of few barriers to participation in harvest and/or 
access to market (Table 2g). These networks involve 
widespread participation and exchanges among a larger 
number of individuals and are more likely where 
enforcement is weak.
Trade frequently involves compounded networks that 
integrate multiple configurations (Table 2). For example, 
Southeast Asia’s trade in wild, ornamental orchids affects 
hundreds of species and involves unexpectedly complex 
trade networks (Figure 2; WebPanel 1).
Beyond actor and network mapping, understanding 
IWT requires evaluation of the contexts that shape 
actors’ decisions – determining actual and perceived 
rewards, effort, preferences, and risks associated with 
illegal behavior (eg WebPanel 2; Ostrom 2011). These 
contextual factors include biological characteris-
tics (species abundance, distribution, fecundity) 
and physical variables (topography, seasonality, 
 infrastructure), which affect access to wildlife as well as 
effort and profitability from IWT. Decisions are further 
shaped by governance context, such as the legal–regula-
tory framework and the effectiveness of enforcement, 
which influence the secrecy and effort involved in 
 harvest, processing, and transport; the penalties associ-
ated with getting caught; and the perceived legiti-
macy of the rules (South and Wyatt 2011; Moreto 
and Lemieux 2014). Decisions are also defined by 
social context, including individual agency (Duffy et al. 
2015), relationships to specific wildlife products 
Table 2. Typology of common IWT network configurations
Type of network
Illustrative architecture: harvesters 
(black circles) – intermediaries (white 
circles) – consumers (triangles) Explanation
(a) Subsistence and local use Harvest principally for household or very local use
(b) Harvester directly to consumer Harvesters have direct market access, usually due to 
geographic proximity
(c) Restricted access Resources access at source is limited by species distribu-
tion, required harvest technology, user group rights and/
or enforcement
(d) Gatekeeper Market access is limited by a small number of intermediar-
ies, potentially because of their ability to circumvent legal 
restrictions, access to technology, or market 
monopolization. 
(e) Market space restricted Market access relies on a limited number of sites or 
platforms (eg markets, Internet sites) 
(f) Multiple barriers to market Market access limited by multiple barriers, such as 
geographic distance, high enforcement and/or processing 
demands
(g) Redundant channels There are few barriers to participation in illegal trade, 
potentially because resource is abundant or widely 
distributed, and/or enforcement is low
Notes: The network types listed (a– g) can refer to either the structure of entire networks or to the “building blocks” of more complex, compound networks.
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(Gao and Clark 2014), knowledge about where to find 
wildlife, and levels of trust, fidelity, transparency, and 
benefit sharing among actors (McGloin and Kirk 2010; 
Radjawali 2011).
IWT actors and networks are dynamic; they adjust to 
changes in biophysical parameters (seasonality, weather, 
abundance), market pressures (price increases), and 
governance contexts. For instance, some consumers’ 
preferences for rarity can simultaneously increase har-
vest pressure and increase rarity (Courchamp et al. 
2006). Changes in enforcement actions can yield novel 
interactions (Williams 1998). For example, increased 
enforcement apparently led to new configurations in 
Russia’s falcon trade (Wyatt 2009) and to a shift to 
online sales in China’s ivory trade (Gao and Clark 
2014).
 J Implications for conservation
Trade dynamics are a function of interactions among 
actors, networks, and products, which are themselves 
embedded in a range of biological, physical, governance, 
and social contexts (Figure 3). These factors not only 
interact but also shape how different conservation 
 interventions play out, including likelihood of success 
and unintended outcomes.
Faced with this complexity, a typological approach has 
the potential to help conservation practitioners consoli-
date vocabulary and concepts across taxa and contexts. 
It is particularly useful with regard to limited ecological 
data, conservation resources, uncertainty, and conten-
tion over the most appropriate interventions, to facili-
tate policy debates, inform research, and craft more 
nuanced, socially appropriate, fair, and effective inter-
ventions. The following examples highlight parts of a 
typology- based framework (see also WebPanel 3) and 
how it can be used to inform interventions, with 
each species also benefitting from full evaluation (eg 
WebPanel 1).
Example 1: Defining products – Southeast Asian 
orchid products
Commercial trade is an intense, targeted threat to many 
Southeast Asian orchid species (Figure 2; Phelps 2015; 
Phelps and Webb 2015). Conservation efforts have 
traditionally focused on restricting international trade, 
although these rules are widely disregarded (Phelps and 
Webb 2015). Structured IWT analysis (Figure 3) high-
lights opportunities for strengthened interventions, in-
cluding those based on an improved understanding of 
orchid products themselves.
There are important differences (in consumer prefer-
ences, prices, and networks) between the trade of rela-
tively common ornamental species and that of rare and 
endemic species targeted by specialist consumers (Hinsley 
et al. 2015; Phelps 2015). Moreover, the trade in orna-
mental orchids exists alongside a trade in medicinal spe-
cies. Although both involve similar geographic areas and 
even some of the same species (eg Dendrobium nobile), 
these transactions generally involve separate actors and 
networks, and are largely decoupled from trade in other 
wildlife (Phelps 2015).
Conservation interventions must therefore define 
which subset of orchid products they target. For example, 
while conservation actions have primarily focused on 
Figure 3. Framework for evaluating IWT interventions to consider contextual parameters, products, actors (Table 1), networks 
(Table 2), and their relationships to conservation interventions. The framework is expanded in WebTable 1.
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overseas markets, much trade is regional (Phelps and 
Webb 2015). Moreover, despite considerable sales activ-
ity at public markets, this predominantly involves orna-
mental species (Phelps 2015); interventions focused on 
these markets would largely overlook the region's grow-
ing trade in medicinal orchids. Differences among prod-
ucts also shape consumer- oriented interventions, and 
must distinguish between informal gardeners who might 
unintentionally buy wild ornamental plants and special-
ists who may be aware of, but unconcerned about, the 
conservation implications of their purchases (Phelps et al. 
2014). Raising awareness through targeted outreach and 
offering improved access to sustainable greenhouse- 
grown plants can effectively change behavior in informal 
gardeners, but may fail to influence specialists, who might 
be more motivated by enforcement.
Example 2: Characterizing actors – South African 
rhinoceros horn harvesters
South Africa, home to over 80% of the world’s 
 remaining white rhinos (Ceratotherium simum), saw a 
tenfold increase in poaching between 2007 and 2014, 
principally to supply the East Asian medicinal trade 
(Milliken and Shaw 2012). Conservation efforts focus 
on strengthening trade bans through anti- poaching ef-
forts at the point of harvest and enhanced enforcement 
efforts along the supply chain (Biggs et al. 2013; Milliken 
2014). However, effective interventions must also rec-
ognize that rhino poaching involves a diversity of 
harvester types and contexts.
Substantial illegal harvest takes place within Kruger 
National Park by residents of neighboring, generally 
impoverished communities, some of whom may work 
for or with organized criminal syndicates (Milliken 
2014). Illegal harvest also occurs on privately owned 
land, where landholders can collect horns from rhinos 
that die naturally or that are de- horned to minimize 
poaching risk (Biggs et al. 2013). Horns are stored in 
guarded vaults but have recently been subject to theft 
by organized criminal groups (Herskovitz 2013). Faced 
with this dilemma, some farmers have reportedly col-
luded to have horns stolen from their property for 
financial gain.
These distinct roles and contexts may merit different 
interventions. For instance, South African landowners 
can legally own and harvest wildlife on their property. 
Legalizing the international trade of sustainable, non- 
lethally harvested horn could create incentives for these 
actors to engage in conservation and sustainable use 
(Biggs et al. 2013). Nevertheless, interventions necessar-
ily differ in contexts where wildlife is owned by the state 
and where hunting is illegal, such as in national parks or 
in Kenya. These contexts may require enforcement 
alongside alternatives, such as poverty reduction and/or 
payments to local communities as incentives to reduce 
poaching. Conservation practitioners must also be capa-
ble of crafting nuanced responses, such as distinguishing 
between local actors contending with poverty and 
 non- resident actors affiliated with criminal enterprises 
(Roe et al. 2015).
Example 3: Characterizing actors – Amazonian wild 
meat consumers
Ecuador’s Yasuní Biosphere Park and Reserve is a 
 biodiversity hotspot, home to Waorani indigenous com-
munities, and subject to IWT for wild meat. The com-
mercial bushmeat trade – dominated by paca (Cuniculus 
paca), collared peccary (Pecari tajacu), white- lipped 
peccary (Tayassu pecari), and woolly monkeys (Lagothrix 
poeppigii) – expanded in the mid- 1990s and tripled 
 between 2005 and 2007, due to increased  demand 
and improved road access (Suarez et al. 2009). While 
 interventions have traditionally focused on  opportunistic 
enforcement against harvesters and  transporters, IWT 
involves a much broader range of actors, including 
distinct types of consumers.
Local communities have ancestral rights to legally hunt 
for subsistence household use (Suarez et al. 2009). Their 
consumption is distinct from the illegal trade to satisfy 
demand among shift workers visiting the region (eg those 
from the petroleum industry), rural- to- urban migrants 
seeking wild meat in the city, and domestic tourists inter-
ested in sampling traditional cuisine (Suarez et al. 2009; 
Poats et al. 2011).
A collaboration among TRAFFIC, the Ministry of 
Environment, and local communities has tailored interven-
tions to each consumer group (A Puyol, B Ortiz, SV Poats, 
pers comms; Poats 2011). Local residents dependent on 
legal subsistence harvest were engaged via incentives, nego-
tiation, and enforcement to conduct more selective harvest, 
avoid hunting in core protected areas, and reduce their 
participation in commercial IWT. In contrast, low- and 
middle- income urban consumers were targeted with educa-
tional messaging – presented by a popular mayor via the 
regional bus network – in an effort to diminish consump-
tion. Shift workers were pursued via messaging displayed by 
the principal regional airline used by industry; in addition, 
restaurants frequented by these workers were offered culi-
nary training to serve alternative dishes and asked to post 
signs advertising that they no longer served wild meat. 
Likewise, domestic tourists were targeted through higher- 
end restaurants and with national television spots.
Example 4: Understanding networks – Indonesian 
pet reptiles
Indonesia is a leading source in the global trade of 
pet reptiles, most of which are wild- caught (Figure 4; 
Lyons and Natusch 2011; Nijman et al. 2012b; Natusch 
and Lyons 2012). Although often poorly designed and 
ignored, harvest quotas have traditionally been relied 
on to regulate international trade of these species (Lyons 
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and Natusch 2011). Trade analysis specifically highlights 
opportunities for strategic interventions at key points 
of the network (Figure 4).
The US is a leading market for wild- collected Indonesian 
pet reptiles. This trade relies on a small group of gatekeep-
ers (Table 2d), including intermediary logisticians who 
coordinate harvest across the archipelago, launderers 
who integrate wild- caught individuals into legal breeding 
facilities (Lyons and Natusch 2011; Natusch and Lyons 
2012), and a few US intermediaries (Table 1). Given the 
challenges associated with implementing conservation 
interventions against harvesters distributed across 
 hundreds of Indonesian islands, it would be more efficient 
and feasible to instead target the US and Indonesian 
 gatekeepers, whose behavior could be shaped through 
international monitoring and enforcement, and/or new 
legislation requiring that US importers obtain proof of 
parentage to demonstrate animals are indeed captive bred 
(C Shepherd and S Stoner, pers comms).
 J Conclusion
The complexity of IWT precludes simple or standardized 
solutions, yet our policy debates and tools – including 
narrow approaches to enforcement and interventions 
(through CITES) – are often very coarse (Challender 
2015). The typologies we present enable more structured 
analyses of products, actors, networks, and contexts that 
can help guide conservation actions and research inquiry. 
For example, clarification of diverse actor roles that moves 
beyond caricatures of wildlife poachers will facilitate closer 
examinations of the relative economic benefits from trade, 
as well as the non-economic motivations that drive dif-
ferent actors to participate in IWT (Duffy et al. 2015); 
this can, in turn, inform more appropriate, fair, and 
effective conservation actions. Similarly,  recognition of 
different types of products and consumers can guide more 
detailed research on motivations and uses (Hinsley et al. 
2015; Truong et al. 2015).
The typologies can also assist with determining which 
types of interventions are most appropriate under different 
conditions, such as for geographically restricted  versus 
widely distributed species; species for which  consumers 
are, or are not sensitive to changes in price; and IWT 
involving local residents versus non-resident  harvesters. 
More thorough analyses will be critical to designing strate-
gic, targeted, and appropriate interventions for reducing 
IWT. Efforts to improve policy responses, however, first 
require the terms and tools to articulate and distinguish 
among diverse IWT actors and phenomena.
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